Where Peace and Truth Intersect

Let us first look at “truth.” Hashem has created every single person with unique daas, best described as “cognitive perception.” Thus, while people can come to agreement about dry objective facts, they have a broad range of opinions regarding ideas and values, and each of those opinions almost always has some element of truth to it. So how do we deal with that?
When there was a Sanhedrin, we had the most ideal way to resolve our issues. If any of the lower courts could not reach a decision, the question went to the Sanhedrin, whose ruling became the absolute halachah for every single Jew. Someone could still dissent in a conceptual way. He could offer his view in an academic setting, where he had every right to present an alternative theory.
However, no one (even another member of the Sanhedrin) was allowed to overrule or disobey the ruling of the Sanhedrin. Doing so was a capital crime. Thus, peace and truth were accomplished in tandem. The “truth” part of the equation was produced by the Sanhedrin’s deliberations and debates. The “peace” part came from the fact that their ruling had to be accepted by all.
But the Sanhedrin stands alone as the only institution that has the power to mandate a unified approach to halachah throughout Klal Yisrael. Nevertheless, since Sanhedrin’s absence, the tasks of teaching and ruling on halachah have been carried out by our rabbanim, and they must go on. The Torah must remain responsive to the needs and issues of the times in which people are living.
On a kehillah level, one “halachic truth” can still exist. In a town with one community, the local beis din or mara d’asra has the power to rule on matters of halachah, and such rulings become binding on that kehillah. Those in authority can also set various takanos for the public benefit. However, if there are two communities even in that one town, they each need to act in accordance with their own Torah leaders.
In that case, we have two communities, each acting according to the “truth” as interpreted by its rabbanim. But given their differing visions, can there be “peace” as well? Without a Sanhedrin, how can we ever reach the balanced state that Zechariah describes?

Let us examine the question by analyzing the dynamics between Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai, which may be considered the embodiment of halachic dispute. Their arguments permeate all of Shas, but in two areas specifically, these arguments should have led to an unraveling of Klal Yisrael’s social fabric. In the area of kashrus (more specifically tumah and taharah), one permitted that which the other prohibited. In the area of marriage, Beis Hillel held that some of Beis Shammai’s offspring ought to be considered mamzerim.
The result of these two disputes would seem to necessitate a complete severance of Hillel’s followers from those of Shammai. How could the two camps socialize with each other if they could not eat together or marry into each other’s families? However, the baraisa (Yevamos 14) concludes, “Although Beis Hillel and Beis Shammai argued in [these areas]… they did not refrain from marrying each other or from eating with each other. This teaches us that there was friendship and love between them, fulfilling the verse to ‘love truth and peace.’ ”
How did they establish this peace amid their conflicting truths? They did not do so by compromising their respective halachic rulings, but rather by communicating clearly with each other, informing each other of what was permissible for the other to eat and whom they were permitted to marry. This incredible balance of total fidelity to conflicting truths alongside deep friendship and respect is almost impossible for us to imagine.
This behavior exemplifies the peace aspect of the equation, the ability to remain friends despite such differences of opinion. And to an even greater extent, Hillel and Shammai’s behavior exemplified the other half of the equation: truth.
The Gemara (Eiruvin 13b) states that in most disputes, we adhere to Beis Hillel’s rulings. The reason for this is “because they [Beis Hillel] were humble, and not only studied Beis Shammai’s opinion, but would even start by first considering Beis Shammai’s opinion.” This does not mean that simply because of their good middos, they were rewarded with confirmation of their halachic decisions. Rather, it means that because they considered Beis Shammai’s opinion first, and in an unbiased manner, their understanding was fuller and closer to the truth.
To arrive at the truth, a person must consider the other side with an open mind. Not only before his decision, but even afterward, he needs to be willing to consider other approaches. Thus, the Mishnah (Eduyos 1:4) teaches us that we record a halachah that has been retracted by its proponent “to teach us that one should always be open to retracting one’s viewpoint in face of the truth.”
The Rambam in his introduction to his commentary on the Mishnah states:

And the reason that required them to write the opinion of a man and afterwards that he recanted from that opinion — for example, when they said, “The House of Shammai said like this and the House of Hillel said like this and that, and the House of Hillel recanted to instruct like the words of the House of Shammai” — is in order to inform you of [the need for] the love of truth and the power of righteousness and faith.
And behold, when these honorable, pious, and magnanimous men, who were outstanding in their wisdom, saw that the words of the one who is in disagreement with them were better than their words and [that] their investigation was correct, they conceded to him and recanted their [own] opinion. All the more so, when other people see that the truth is leaning toward the one with whom they have a conflict, [such a one] should lean toward the truth and not stiffen his neck. And this is the [meaning of the] verse (Devarim 16:20), “Justice, justice shall you pursue.”

A distressing example of what it means to stifle Torah debate is written by the Chayei Adam (who lived in Vilna and held the Vilna Gaon in the highest possible esteem), in his introduction to Binas Adam. He states: