Time to Arm Taiwan

Ever since Nixon’s dramatic China visit in 1972, American policy on the Communist giant has been a fantasyland. Known as the “One-China policy,” it attempted to reconcile China’s claim to Taiwan with the US commitment to the island nation’s independence.

At heart was a piece of lomdus. Since both China and Taiwan — whose Nationalist leaders escaped to the island after their defeat in the Chinese civil war in 1949 — agreed that there was only one China, the way forward was simple. America would recognize one China, and remain coy over which side they meant. It was part of a policy of ambiguity, to ensure both that Taiwan didn’t declare independence, and that China didn’t attack.

Almost 40 years after Nixon’s visit, that fiction is now history. China’s President Xi made it clear in a speech in July that while he prefers peaceful reunification, a military option is very much on the table. A top US naval officer, Admiral Philip Davidson, recently told the Senate that an attack could come within the next six years.

Two weeks ago, China sent dozens of military jets into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone, in a clear display of muscle. That military power has grown so much that it could exact a high cost from any US force coming to Taiwan’s rescue — unlike in 1996, when President Clinton faced down Chinese belligerence by sending an armada through the Taiwan Straits.