“They built a ring of fire around Israel and thought Israel would crumble. It’s clear that did not work”
There are grounds for optimism, rationales for realism, a solid basis for healthy skepticism, and some mandatory pessimism when evaluating Israel’s logic in signing a 60-day ceasefire agreement in Lebanon.
Let’s start with the realism.
The IDF is strained to capacity. In addition to maintaining a standing army with an estimated 180,000 soldiers on full alert, Israel has called up some 300,000 reservists during the past year. Some have served seven consecutive months away from their homes, families, and jobs.
The war has exacted a steep economic toll. The Bank of Israel estimates that by the end of 2025, Israel will have spent more than $60 billion (NIS 220 billion) on war expenses, not to mention lost revenues. Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that more than one million hours of work are lost each month because soldiers are on the battlefield instead of at the office.
It’s no secret that in its waning days, the Biden administration, starving for foreign policy achievements, pressured Israel into signing the ceasefire agreement by withholding arms and by threatening to take revenge for Israeli disobedience by supporting a UN resolution calling for a mandatory and enforceable ceasefire on terms even more onerous than the deal Israel agreed to, and perhaps another resolution under which the US would have recognized a Palestinian state.
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