When Is a Deal No Deal?

Recent high-profile White House meetings between President Trump and the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey were intended to reshape the Middle East’s political and security landscape, but the plans they hatched are floundering or have fallen short of expectations.

What’s gone wrong? What midcourse corrections must the US make? Why is Israel worried?

Defining Normal for Saudi Arabia

Both the Trump administration and the Netanyahu government have set a goal of normalizing relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia has hinted it shares that goal. The question is, how to get there?

Israel seems willing to swallow Trump’s proposed sale of F-35s to the Saudis and to live with the US upgrading Saudi Arabia to a major non-NATO ally — a status Israel attained in 1987 — as long as Saudi Arabia normalizes relations with Israel. That didn’t happen during Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit last week to Washington.

Trump didn’t spray perfume on MBS as he did the week prior when Syria’s Ahmed al-Shaara visited, but if he thought he could sweet-talk MBS or tempt him to join the Abraham Accords with a $148 billion military package, he thought wrong. MBS taught Trump a lesson about how Middle Eastern nations view the art of the deal, Arab negotiating style, where they appear to be accommodating, creating the illusion of commitment, while simultaneously maintaining their positions.

They did sign deals, although the US did not release the text of the agreements for a strategic defense pact or for US assistance in developing a peaceful nuclear energy program in the desert kingdom. It’s also unlikely that the Saudis will get F-35s to rival Israel’s fleet, considering how much Israeli proprietary technology is built into the Israeli F-35I-Adir jet.