Two facts emerge that show how much worse the war could have been
As Yom Kippur of 1973 approached, ready to wreathe the Holy Land in an atmosphere of sanctity, only a small number of Israelis saw the black war clouds piling on their country’s borders.
But the military leaders — privy to the aerial intelligence that displayed the frightening disparity of forces in favor of Israel’s Arab enemies — saw it all, and did nothing.
On the west bank of the Suez Canal were arrayed 100,000 Egyptian soldiers, accompanied by 1,350 tanks and 2,000 artillery pieces. Facing this buildup, on Israel’s bank, were the few hundred men left to guard the Canal, backed up by a mere 44 artillery pieces and 290 tanks.
Reconnaissance photos of the northern border showed a similar picture. Five Syrian divisions confronted a thin line of Israeli outposts atop the rocky Golan Heights. The disparity in Syria’s favor was shocking: Not only did they have an 8-to-1 advantage in armored forces — their Soviet-made tanks were equipped for night-fighting, whereas Israel’s would be blinded after dark. In infantry and artillery, the odds were stacked even more heavily in the Arabs’ favor.
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